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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc., 
regarding special fuel tax 
liability for the years of 
October 1973 to September 
1976, before the Utah State 
Tax CoITu'lli s s ion 
Case No. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
16797 
The Utah State Tax. Commission, after a hearing, affirmed 
the assessment of the special fuel tax against Parson Asphalt 
Products, Inc., (Respondent herein) in the sum of $16, 711. 94, 
plus interest and penalties. Respondent appealed and 
petitioned review to the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for the County of Weber, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION Of THE CASE IN THE LOWER pOURT_ 
After a trial de ngyo, Judge John F. Wahlquist, presidiqg 
without a jury, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order, Judgment and Decree ruling that the fuel 
used by Petitioner for and during the reconstruction of 
State Highway 127, known as the road to Antelope Island, was 
exempt from the special fuel tax and set aside the decision 
and order of the State Tax Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA.L 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
court affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts recited in the stipulation 
the trial court heard the testimony of Mont Wilson, engi-
neer for Respondent, received into evidence documentary 
evidence by way of an exhibit which showed amounts spent 
and work·done on this road since.its designation in 1965, 
and reviewed the transcript of the hearing held before the 
State Tax Commission. 
The original design of the road was inadequate. It 
was too narrow and the sides were too steep and was there-
fore subject to erosion due to wind and water action. As 
a result of the erosion the road washed out annually, 
(R 71, 72) and was under water for 4 to 6 months at a time. 
It was not substantial enough to remain generaly open for 
public traffic.· (R 69) 
The State expended about $25,000.00 per year commencing 
in 1976, to maintain the road and in addition contracted 
for extensive repairs with private contractors in 1965, 
1968, 1969, 1979, 1971, 1972 and 1973. (Exhibit lP) 
However, the annual washouts continued until the road 
was redesigned and rebuilt by Respondent pursuant to con-
tract in 1973. (R 78) 
The new road was significantly different from the old 
one. It was much wider having a subbase in :some areas as 
wide as 220 feet. It had a different side slope design in 
that they were very flat (beach slopes) so that the wave 
-2-
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action would not cause it to erode. (R 75) 
Since the reconstruction the road has not washed out. 
(R 78) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT LIMITED TO ':j:'HE 
11 ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 19 ST A..N'DARD OF 
REVIErv. 
Appellant argues that since U.C.A. 41-11-50 provides 
for an exemption from the fuel tax in those c~ses where 
the purchasers or users of speci~l fuel shall establish 
to the satisfaction of the Corrunissiqn that they are entitled 
to the exemption, the Commission's decision spould not be 
set aside unless it acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 
capriciously. This argument ignores the plaip language 
of the applicable statutes. u.c.~. 59-24-3(1) provides: 
All appeals from and petitions for review of 
decisions of the State Tax Commission brpuqht before 
the tax division of any district court shall be 
original, independent proceedings and shall be 
tried without jury and de nova. 1 
U.C.A. 59-24-4 adds that: 
. In proceedings of the tax division of any. 
district court and on appeal therefrom, a pre-
pqnderance of the evidence shall suffice to sus~ 
tqin the burden of proof. . . . · 
Under these statutes, the instant proceedings should be inde-
pendent and de nova with a preponderance of evidence sufficient 
to sustain the burden of proof. Therefore, the trial court 
- 3--
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was not limited to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
of review but should make a fresh examination of the issues. 
POINT II 
THE ROAD TO ANTELOPE ISLAND WAS NOT A 
"HIGHWAY" UNDER THE UTAH USE FUEL TAX ACT. 
The centra1 issue in this case is whether the road to 
Antelope Island qualifies as a "highway" under the Utah Use 
Fuel Tax Act (the "A9t"), U.C.A. 41-11-48, et seq. If the road 
does not, the~ Respondent is exempt from the fuel tax by 
the operation of U.C.A. 41-11-50. This statute provides 
in part: 
A tax is hereby imposed at the rate of seven 
cents* per gallon on the sale or use of special 
fuel, provided that the sale or use of special fuel 
for any purpose other than to operate or propel a 
motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah shall 
be exempt from application of this tax. . . . 
Thu§>, if the instant road was not a "highway" under the Act, 
l-1 
Respondent qualifies for the exemption. 
As support for its argument that the instant road was 
a "highway," the Appellant invokes the definition of "public 
highway" froro U.C.A. 27-12-2(8). It would be inappropriate, 
however, to apply a definition from Title 27 to a matter 
involving the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act in Title 41 when the 
Act contains its own definition of "highway." U.C.A. 41-ll-49(c) 
provides: 
*By a recent amendment, the tax rate has been changed 
to nine cents per gallon, but this change does not affect 
this case. 
-4-
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Highway shall mean and include every way or· place, 
of whatever nature, generally open to the use of the 
public for the purpose of vehicular travel notwith-
standing that the same may be temporarily closed for 
the purpose of conptruction, reconstruction, maintenance 
or repair. 
Since the Act contains its own· definition of "highway," 
it· would be inappropriate to resort to a definition outside 
the Act. This is partipularly true where the definition from 
Title 27 is limited in application to Chapters 12 and 13 of 
the Title: U.C.A. 27-12-2 provides: "As used in chapters 
12 and 13 of this title: (8) Public Highway means. II 
Applying the definition of ''highway" froJU the Act to the 
instant facts suggests that that road to Antelope Island fails 
to qualify a.s a 11 highway." The Act provides that a road will 
be a 11 highway 11 only if it is 11 generally open to the use of the 
public." From the time of the first attempt at construction, 
the road was washed out each year. Indeed, it was closed about 
as much as it was open. The Appellant ignores the compelling 
nature of these facts and instead argues that because the 
road was open at least as often as it was closed, it·was 
"generally open." No simpl~ comparison of the number of days 
the road was open to the number closed will suffice, however. 
Instead, "generally open" should be given its corrunon everyday 
meaning. Emmertson v. State Tax Commission, 72 P2d 467, 470 
Looking at the phrase "generally open 11 from this perspective, 
it is evident that a ~oad washed out this often fails to 
qualify as 11 generally open." 
-5-
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The conclusion that the instant road was not 11 generally 
open" is supported further by the use of the word "temporarily" 
elsewhere in the statute. As more fully detailed above, U.C.A. 
41-11-49 (c) provides, "Highway shall mean . . every way 
generally open . . . notwithstanding that the same may be 
temporarily closed 11 The word "temporarily" means not 
of long duration, not permanent, but for a short time." 
Fischer v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 225 NW2d 542, 545 To 
the same effect are Worthington v. McDonald, 68 NW2d 89, 92 
and Shelton ~- Shelton, 280 SW2d 803, 805. Since the road 
to Antelope Island was closed about as often as it was open, 
it can hardly be said that the closure was "not of long 
duration, not permanent, but for a short time." Thus, the 
closure was more than temporary, so the instant road fails 
to qualify as a "highway." 
The conclusion that the road was not a "highway" is 
supported by case law as well. In Armstrong v. City of St. 
Louis, 3 ~,10 J App. 151, 15 7, the Court said,: !':It is a contra-
diction in terms of speak of an impassable public highway. 
We might as well speak of an uninhabitable dwelling house, 
or an invisible illumination. 11 
1 Santoro V.. Brooks, 254 P. 1019 (Oregon) also supports 
the conclusion that the instant road was not a "highway.": 
This· case involved a suit in negligence for damages arising 
from an automobile accident. The negligence issue pivoted 
-6-
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on whether the site of the accident was an intersection. 
Under Oregon law an intersection is ''the point or place 
where on highway or public way joins another at an angle. 11 
Thus, to determine whether the q.cctdent occurred at an 
intersection, the Court firat had to determine if there were 
two "highways" coming together:. Although one road has been 
dedicated as a "highway 11 and was shown as sµch on the official 
city plat, the Court held that it was not a highway for these 
This st.re~t wa~ but little used and was a 
dump ground for' a brqk~n-down automobile. It 
was also conpidered a 'good place to pile lumber 
and to -keep aand and gravel. During one per~od 
in its history it was used as a cow pasture and 
had been faqned to some. extent . . . (and) "was 
all grown up to grass. 11 • 
As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that 
"This alleged. street>, under the conditions existing at the 
time1 of the. accident, did not constitute a 'highway or 
public yiay, 1 as con~emplated by O<regon Motor Ve.hicle Law." 
(Ibid.) 
The instant facts even more strongly than the Santoro 
facts suggest that the road was not a ":highway ... because in 
Santoro the road had merely fallen into disuse but remained 
passable, whereas here, the road was not even passable for 
several months each year .. Thus, the holding of Sant~ 
· that the road was not a "highway." supports the conclusion 
-7-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE ROAD 
WAS A NEW ROAD IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Because the original design of the road was inadequate, 
it washed out annually and was under water for 4 to 6 months 
at a time. Mr. Wilson, engineer for respondent, was formerly 
employed by State Highway Department as a resident engineer 
and construction project engineer and was familiar with 
the history of the Antelope Island Road since its desi9natLion 
in 1965. (R 62-66) Referring to a period of time in 1965 
and 1966, Mr. Wilson stated: 11 The road as attempted by the 
State and County forces was not--did not--accomplish the 
purpose of a road. NanEly, it was constructed and for short 
periods of time the road was open to public traffic, but 
the road as constructed by the State was not substantial 
enough to remain in passover condition for public traffic." 
(R 69) Referring to a period of time from 1965 forward, 
Mr. Wilson went on to say: "and it was the consensus of 
that group of engineers that the section of the road was 
not sufficient to, first of all, stay in place and carry 
the requlring traffic loading from the mainland to the 
island. It was felt that it was not substantial. It wasn't 
constructed to the necessary typical section to remain in 
place.*** And it was felt that the attempt to build the 
road was, unless it was done in a proper manner, funded 
-8-
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to the proper extent to build a proper road, it would 
never stay in. It would never become a road.*** The 
design and the_ construction of the road was in the beginning-·-
the fill slopes, the side slopes of the fille were too steep. 
The width of the road where the public traveled was not wide 
enough. It was subject to erosion from wind action, wave 
action, water action. And this was later proved by the 
necessity to go in and continually try to keep in in shape 
such that it could carry traffic. (R 69-72) 
Exhibit 1-P indicated that the State expended about 
$25,000.~00 per year commencing in 1965, to maintain the 
road and in addition contracted ·for extensive repairs with 
private contractors as follows: 
1965 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
$223,440.00 
139,452.00 
189,550.00 
59,159.00 
99,916.00 
14 6, 35 3. 0 0 
337,426.00 
The annual washouts continued to occur until the road 
was redesigned and rebuilt by R:espondent pursuant to contract 
ip 1973 costing $2,209.627.00 (imported borrow) (and there-
after bridge structur~ work was done by Pritchett Construction 
{$54,312.00 bid) and surfacing by LeGrande Johnson ($636,23i.oo 
bid) . ) 
The new road as constructed by Respondent was signifi-
cantly different from the 9ld road. It was much wider and 
-9-
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had a different configuration. Mr. Wilson stated: "'!'he 
subbase which we constructed in some cases was as wide as 
220 feet. This, plus another significant different in the 
road as we constructed it was that the fill slooes were 
very flat and they called them beach slopes. It was designed 
with the theory that the wave action would come up these 
very flat slopes, pie~ up the sediment, film material, and 
then when the wave returnedc >back to the main body of water 
it. would :·drop that seQ.irnent leave it there and hence the 
road would remain in place rather than being washed out 
into the lake. 11 .(R 75) 
The pictures introduced into evidence by Respondent 
(hearing exhibits 11-121, prints, and trail exhibits 2P-11P, 
slides), illustrate the washout conditions from 1965 until 
the rebuilding was done. 
Based on .Mr .. Wilson's testimony, which was uncontested 
both at the hearing before the State Tax Commission and at 
the trial de novo, and the stipulation of the parties, the 
trial Judge properly concluded that the road as constructed 
by Respondent was a new road. 
CONCLUSION 
The review by the District Court was a trail de novo 
allowing the trial Judge to make new findings, supported by 
a prepo~derance of the evidence. 
-10-
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From 1965 until the road was built by Respondent 
annual attempts to construct the road failed. Evidence 
before the trial court supports the position that the 
road to Antelope Island was impassable so often that 
it failed to qualify as a "highway" within the meaning 
of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act. Finally after successive 
failures to build an adequate road the project was 
radically redesigned and adequately funded resulting in 
the construction of a new road which has withstood 
the test of time. 
The· judgment of the trial court ought to be 
affirmed. 
DATED this day of March, 1980. 
R.·espectfully ru mitted, 
_) __ .. ~ ~) . 
....----/ . // I , ) / . /1 
(~ . c['.(_/ Ct.-L/ I ,, .. // . <../'--
LA VAR E. STARK 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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